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In Carte Blanche Corp. v. Pappas,' this well-known credit
card company sued for the amount of certain purchases and one
of the defenses was liberative prescription. The prescriptive
period for an action on account is three years,2 whereas for a
general action on contract the period is ten years.8 Since the debts
were incurred as "accounts for merchandise . . . at the time of
origin they were open accounts for which purchasers received
monthly statements,' 4 and since the assignee credit card com-
pany steps into the shoes of the assignor, the court held the ac-
tion to be one "on account" and subject to the three-year pre-
scription.
The conclusion of the court in this case may well be sound,
but it would be too broad a generalization to say that all claims
by credit card companies will be classified as "actions on account."
It is more significant to emphasize the court's point that the as-
signee has "the rights possessed by the assignor at the time of
the assignment"5 so that if the original claim was that of an "inn-
keeper . . . on account of lodging and board" the appropriate
prescription against the credit card company would be one year
under Civil Code article 3534; and if the original claim was based
on a general contract, the ten-year prescription under Civil Code
article 3544 would apply.
Pursuant to this analysis, where an insurance agent trans-
mits premiums on behalf of his client to the insurer, the agent's
claim against his client (the insured) is on the general contract
of insurance and subject to the ten-year prescription," even
though the agent may have sent a monthly statement to his client
showing the balance due on his account.
In Demery v. Voelker, a suit against a notary for negligence
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 216 So.2d 917 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
2. LA. CIV. CODu art, 3538.
3. Id. art. 3544.
4. Carte Blanche Corp. v. Pappas, 216 So.2d 917, 919 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1968).
5. Id. For a discussion of the "assignment" and other analytical theories
of the credit card operation, see Note, 30 LA. L. REV. 162 (1969).
6. See Cusimano, Inc. v. Cusimano, 216 So.2d 344 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
7. 216 So.2d 328 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
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in failing to record an act of servitude was treated as sounding in
tort although it is indicated that the claim "might possibly have
been filed either under contract or tort."s The answer to this
question is not really clear, and it would be necessary to estab-
lish succinctly the nature of the notary's duties and the relation-
ship with his client. In this connection, there should also be ex-
amined for comparison the classification problems incident to
malpractice suits against physicians.9
In Pelican States Associates, Inc. v. Winder,0 the court of
appeal held that the claim of a hospital for room and board, x-
rays, drugs, and so forth was an action on account within the
meaning of Civil Code article 3538 and therefore prescribed in
three years. On this issue, the Louisiana Supreme Court" con-
firmed the classification of the nature of the cause of action-but
neither of the two judicial opinions cites any authority for this
conclusion.
Articles 3534-3543 of the Civil Code contain the enumeration
of several different kinds of actions for which the specific pre-
scriptive periods range from one year to five years. Three of these
items in article 3538 refer to "accounts" which are subject to a
three-year prescription. Article 3544 provides: "In general, all
personal actions, except those before enumerated, are prescribed
by ten years."
Hospital charges for room and board, and so on, are not in-
cluded among "those before enumerated" and should therefore
be subject to the general ten-year prescription for personal ac-
tions. If the submission of a statement or an account were to
transform any creditor's claim into an "action on account," then
every action for a claim even among "those before enumerated"
for which a statement or account had been submitted would be
an "action on account." This hardly fits in with the purpose of
the redactors in making such a detailed enumeration, followed
by the omnibus provision aifd the exception in Article 3544.
A clear judicial interpretation of the matter was made some
8. Id. at 331.
9. See cases and discussion in 24 LA. L. REv. 210, 213 (1964); 25 LA. L.
RV. 355, 356 (1965); 26 LA. L. Rmv. 539-541 (1966).
10. 208 So.2d 355 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
11. Pelican States Associates, Inc. v. Winder, 253 La. 697, 219 So.2d 500
(1969).
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time ago in Antoine v. Franichevich,'2 where the court stated
"the prescriptive period is fixed by the nature of the debt and
not by the fact that an account is rendered showing that the debt
is due" and "in the Code it is intended that the word [accounts]
shall include sales on account, and not the mere fact that an ac-
count must be rendered."
Freiberg v. Rembert's was instituted as an action on an "open
account," the several items of which were spread over a period
of several years. Within three years prior to suit, some payments
had been made and these were imputed by the debtor to certain
specific items; this left unpaid certain other items which dated
more than three years prior to suit and as to these older items the
court held that liberative prescription had run and discharged
the debtor.
In terms of legal analysis, this decision leaves an unclear
impression on three issues: (1) what is the nature of an open
account for which the liberative prescription is three years?14
(2) what is the effect of a debtor's imputation of payment on the
nature of the cause of action? and (3) what is the starting point
for the running of prescription on an "open account"?
To begin with, an action on an open account is a single claim
and is not the cumulation of several separate claims, and a pay-
ment made by the debtor constitutes an acknowledgment which
interrupts prescription for the balance of the account which con-
tinues to be one claim, as one whole.
To say that the debtor's imputations of payments to certain
intermediate items does not constitute an interruption as to the
earlier items and thereby results in their prescription, has the
effect of changing the nature of the cause of action to a series of
separate claims which contradicts the nature of the cause of
action on an open account as a single claim.
The basic principle of the starting point for the running of
liberative prescription is the time at which the creditor could
have acted to enforce payment, that is, to institute suit if neces-
sary. On a credit transaction, the creditor cannot enforce pay-
ment until the expiry of the credit period. The fact situations
12. 163 So. 784, 786 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1935), aff'd, 184 La. 612, 167 So. 98(1936). See also Jones v. Jones, 236 La. 52, 106 So.2d 713 (1958); 20 LA. L. REv.
235, 236 (1960).
13. 213 So.2d 104 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
14. See LA. iv. CoDH art. 3538.
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vary widely, but the principle remains the same. Similarly, an
interruption of prescription by the acknowledgment inherent
in a payment on account also reflects a basic principle which
holds firm despite the variables in fact situations.
From the application of these principles to the case under
consideration, it follows that the debtor's imputations may well
cause the extinction and the elimination of certain specific items
from the account. But this does not change the nature of the
action from being a single claim for the balance of one whole ac-
count on which prescription starts to run anew after an ac-
knowledgment through a partial payment, whether such pay-
ment is in reduction of the general balance or for specific items
by the debtor's imputation. 15
Another vexatious problem concerning classification of the
nature of the cause of action was well settled in the companion
cases of Booth v. Firemdn's Fund Ins. Co.', and Thomas v. Em-
ployers Mut. Fire Ins. Co."' The action by an insured against his
own insurer, under the "Uninsured Motorist Provision" of his
liability policy, for damages caused by an uninsured motorist,
was classified as an action ex contractus arising out of the con-
tract of insurance and not as an action ex delicto9 arising from
the tort of the uninsured motorist who caused the damage. The
court's statements that "the uninsured motorist provision is not
insurance or indemnification for the uninsured motorist, and the
insurer does not stand in the shoes of the uninsured motorist
who is the tortfeasor," and that "the intent of our uninsured
15. The court's statement "such imputed payments do not interrupt the
tolling of prescription on the balance of the account" (213 So.2d at 107) is a
confused mixture of civil law and common law terminology in a context
where the presumed meaning in civil law concepts is that such payments do
not Interfere with the running of prescription-for which the court cites as
authority the case of LeBoeuf v. Riera, 176 So.2d 216 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1965), which in turn refers to Cohen v. Toy, 150 So.2d 605 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1963). In this latter case, the creditor had terminated the debtor's "open
account" and had put him on a "cash" basis, so that the debtor's subsequent
imputation of payments on the "cash" purchase had nothing to do with the
creditor's separate claim for the balance on the open account. The other case
cited in LeBo"uf is Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. St. Pierre, 163 So.2d 132 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1964) in which the creditor and debtor had a number of sepa-
rate transactions which were on a "job-by-job" basis and here again the
debtor's imputation of a payment against a specific item had no relation to
any others because these were several separate claims and not an action on
open account.
16. 253 La. 521, 218 So.2d 580 (1969).
17. 253 La. 531, 218 So.2d 584 (1969).
18. Ten-year prescription under LA. Cirv. CODE art. 3544.
19. One-year prescription under id. art. 3536.
1969] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1968-1969 239
motorist statute and the policy endorsement issued thereunder
is to afford protection to the insured when they become the inno-
cent victims of the negligence of uninsured motorists" 20 give a
clear description of the legal relationships in this fact situation.
The decision is sound and well grounded, and it does away with
the uncertainty and confusion of differences previously expressed
by the courts of appeal.
21
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MINERAL SERVITUDES
Prescription--Effect of Unit Operations
In Barnwell, Inc. v. Carter' the question whether a mineral
servitude owner's rights remained alive turned on whether unit
drilling operations conducted within ten years of the creation
of the subject servitude interrupted prescription. The servitude
had been created in 1954. A compulsory drilling unit was formed
in 1962, and operations were conducted thereon but at a location
off the servitude tract. A second well was drilled on the servi-
tude tract and completed as a producer in 1966. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed a lower court judgment hold-
ing that prescription accruing against the servitude had been
interrupted by the unit operations.
Although the decision rendered by the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Boddie v. Drewett2 had not been overruled at the time
the unit drilling operations in question were conducted, the
court chose to abide by and apply the decision later rendered in
Mire v. Hawkins.8 The latter decision expressly overruled
Boddie as to the effect of dry hole drilling operations on a unit
but at a location off a tract burdened by a mineral servitude
included in the unit. Boddie had held that the operations were
not effective as an interruption of prescription. Mire reversed
that position.
20. Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 253 La. 521, 527, 218 So.2d 580, 583
(1969).
21. See cases cited 4d. at 525 n.4, 218 So.2d at 582 n.4.
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1. 220 So.2d 741 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
2. 229 La. 1017, 87 So.2d 516 (1956).
3. 249 La. 278, 186 So.2d 591 (1966).
